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COMMENTARY
THE FUTURE OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT: PROTECTING ECONOMIC HEALTH
MORE THAN PHYSICAL HEALTH?
David Orentlicher
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Mark Hall has written a terrific symposium paper.' 'It is
exactly the kind of scholarship that we need to see as the Affordable
Care Act (ACA) continues its roll out. We can make educated
guesses about the impact of the ACA, but we will not be able to
make reliable judgments until we have hard data. By measuring
actual outcomes, we will be able to sort out disagreements among
experts regarding the likely effects of the ACA's various provisions.
* Samuel R. Rosen Professor and Co-Director, Hall Center for Law and Health,
Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law. Adjunct Professor of Medicine,
Indiana University School of Medicine. MD, JD, Harvard University. I am grateful for the
excellent editing by the Houston Law Review, especially Brenna Lermon Hill,
Janna Mouret, David Rusk, Veronica Cruz, Scott Armstrong, and Ward Goolsby.
1. Mark A. Hall, Evaluating the Affordable CareAct: The Eye of the Beholder, 51 Hous.
L. REV. 1029 (2014).
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While observers have focused on questions about the extent
to which the ACA will improve access to care, reduce the costs of
care, and improve the quality of care, commentary has largely
ignored an even more important question-to what extent will
the ACA improve health? Surprisingly, the link between health
care insurance and health is more tenuous than one might think.
In the end, the ACA may do more to protect the financial health
of poor Americans than to improve their physical health.

II. COMMON QUESTIONS ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THE ACA
With the roll out of the health insurance exchanges in the
fall of 2013, much analysis considered whether insurance
premiums would increase, decline, or remain about the same
in the individual market. 2 So far, the evidence suggests that
most people will get more for their insurance premium dollar
under the ACA. 3 And this makes sense. When insurers were
pricing their policies, they expected that the ACA's individual
mandate to purchase insurance would bring more of the
younger and healthier population into the insurance risk pool,
allowing a greater spreading of the costs of care for older,
sicker persons. 4 In addition, the health insurance exchanges
make it easier for consumers to compare their options and find
the best value.
2.

Editorial, High and Low Premiums in Health Care, N.Y.

TIMES,

Nov. 11, 2013,

at A24; Robert Pear & Reed Abelson, Officials Detail Premium Costs of Health Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 25, 2013, at Al. Of course, premiums do not tell the whole story. People also
have to consider "deductibles and other out-of-pocket costs." Robert Pear, On Health
Exchanges, Premiums May Be Low, but Other Costs Can Be High, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9,
2013, at A18. The individual market includes health insurance plans purchased by people
for themselves or their families and is distinguished from the market for group insurance
plans. Most Americans with private insurance are covered through group plans that are
sponsored by their employers. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, HENRY J.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE UNINSURED: A PRIMER 1-3 (2013), available at
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/10/7451-09-the-uninsured-aprimer-key-facts-about-health-insurance.pdf.
See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
3.
Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585 (2012). Early
4.
reports found that younger Americans were slower to purchase policies on the health
insurance exchanges. See Haeyoun Park, Tracking the Ages of Health Care Enrollees: Will
2013),
13,
(Dec.
TIMES
N.Y.
Up?,
People Sign
Young
Enough
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/12/14/us/tracking-the-ages-of-health-careenrollees.html?_r=0 (reporting that older people constitute the bulk of private plans
enrollees). But that may have been a temporary phenomenon. See ASPE OFFICE OF
HEALTH POLICY, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACE:
JANUARY ENROLLMENT REPORT 4 (2014), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/
reports/2014/MarketPlaceEnrollment/Jan2Ol4/ib_2014janenrollment.pdf ("[T]here was a
more than eight-fold increase in the cumulative number of young adults ... who have
selected a Marketplace plan through the [Federally-facilitated Marketplace] during the
month of December.").
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However, the ACA's impact on premiums will be uneven.
The ACA's ban on premium surcharges for diabetes, heart
disease, or other "preexisting medical conditions" will favor
people with preexisting conditions over those without health
problems, 5 and urban dwellers generally should see lower rates
than their rural counterparts. 6 The ACA also will eliminate many
low-cost options. Because the ACA requires insurance plans to
meet minimum coverage standards, some people will have to
switch from their pre-ACA plans to more generous, and
7
therefore, more expensive plans.
Another important question is the extent to which the ACA's
8
individual market reforms will ease the "job lock" problem.
Before the ACA's reform of the individual market, high
premiums caused by preexisting conditions created a substantial
obstacle to job mobility. 9 For example, scientists in academia or
industry who wanted to start their own companies would face
very high health care costs if someone in their family had a
history of medical problems. Those costs might deter the budding
entrepreneur. Under the ACA, the creator of a start-up company
will have access to a community-rated health insurance plan,
with subsidies for purchasers whose income does not exceed
400% of the federal poverty level.10
Data will help us judge provisions of the ACA other than those
dealing with the market for individual insurance. For example, to
what extent will the ACA's employer mandate discourage hiring
and increase the rate of unemployment or underemployment? The
employer mandate applies to businesses with at least fifty
employees,1 1 so some businesses may slow their hiring when their
number of employees gets close to fifty. In addition, for employers
By requiring insurers to charge healthy and unhealthy persons the same
5.
amount, the ACA essentially requires healthy persons to subsidize the costs of care for
those who suffer from illness. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2585, 2613-15.
Reed Abelson, Katie Thomas & Jo Craven McGinty, Health Law Fails to Lower
6.
Pricesfor Rural Areas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2013, at Al.
7.
Jonathan Weisman & Robert Pear, Cancellationof Health Care Plans Replaces
Website Problems as Prime Target, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2013, at A17. The federal
government postponed the essential benefits requirement for the first three years of the
individual mandate. Robert Pear, Some Policies Get More Time in Health Shift, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2014, at Al; What Does Marketplace Health Insurance Cover?,
HEALTHCARE.GOV,

https://www.healthcare.gov/what-does-marketplace-health-insurance-

cover/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2014) (describing essential health benefits).
8.
James Surowiecki, The Business End of Obamacare, NEW YORKER, Oct. 14,
2013, at 42.
Id.
9.
26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(3)(A)(i) (2012).
10.
11.
Id. § 4980H(c)(2)(A). More specifically, the mandate kicks in at fifty full-time
equivalents. Id. § 4980H(c)(2)(E).
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subject to the mandate, coverage must be provided only to
employees who work at least thirty hours per week. 12 As a result,
some employers will limit the hours worked per week for many of
their employees at twenty-nine. 13 Experts differ on the extent to
which the ACA will affect hiring decisions,1 4 and hard data will be
very important in sorting this issue out. In the meantime, data to
date do not suggest a major impact. 15
Good data also can tell us when our intuitions lead us
astray. The real world often acts in unexpected ways. For
example, it is often assumed that when the government cuts its
reimbursement rates under Medicare and Medicaid, hospitals
and other health care providers will respond by raising fees for
privately insured patients. Indeed, McCue and Hall found that:
One national insurer ... attributed a portion of its [20122013 rate] increase to concerns that the [ACA] will reduce
provider payments under Medicare and Medicaid, causing
providers to increase the amount they charge privately
insured patients. This insurer did not state[, however,] that
such cost-shifting had already happened, and recent
literature questions the extent to which it tends to occur. 16
McCue and Hall cite a study published in the May 2013
issue of Health Affairs in which the researcher found that

12.
Id. § 4980H(c)(4)(A).
13.
Of those employers who limit hours worked, some will impose the limits not so
they can drop previously provided coverage but so they can avoid having to extend
coverage to workers who previously were not eligible for the employer's health care plan.
J.D. Harrison, ObamacarePromptingBusinesses to Cut Employee Hours? So Far, Yes and
No, WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/on-small.
business/obamacare-prompting-businesses-to-cut-employee-hours-so.far-yesandno/2013/10/29/flfee542-40b7-11e3-a624-4ld661b0bb78_story.html.
14.
Compare Andrew Puzder, Op-Ed., ObamaCare and the Part-Time Economy,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2013, at A15 (suggesting that the impact of the ACA has had obvious
negative effects on hiring), with Carlos Torres, Economists See Little Effect on Hiringfrom
U.S. Health-Care Law, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2014-01-27/economists-see-little-effect-on-hiring-from-u-s-health.care-law.html
("The vast
majority of U.S. companies said the implementation of the Obama administration's
health-care law will have no effect on their businesses or hiring plans ... ").
15.
Ben Casselman, Part-Time Work Still Up, but Health Law Isn't the Cause, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 23, 2013, at A4; Stephen Rattner, Op-Ed., The Biggest Economy Killer: Our
Government, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/24/opinion/
rattner-the-biggest-economy-killer-our-government.html. But see Robert Pear, Public
Sector Capping Part-Time Hours to Skirt Health Care Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2014, at
A12 (indicating that public sector employers are limiting many of their employees to no
more than twenty-nine hours per week); Puzder, supra note 14.
16.
MICHAEL J. MCCUE & MARK A. HALL, COMMONWEALTH FUND, WHAT'S BEHIND
HEALTH INSURANCE RATE INCREASES? AN EXAMINATION OF WHAT INSURERS REPORTED TO
THE
FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT
IN
2012-2013,
at 6
(2013),
available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/Files/Publications/Issue%2OBrief/2013/Dec/17
21._McCue_whats_behindhltins.rate.increasesjib.pdf.
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reductions in Medicare reimbursement to hospitals for inpatient
care have led to complementary reductions in inpatient payments
by private insurers rather than the increases found by other
researchers. 17 According to the author, the decline in private
payments could have occurred because private payment rates are
often set as a multiple of Medicare payment rates or because cuts
in Medicare reimbursement cause hospitals to lower their
operating costs.' 8 A subsequent study suggests that the latter
effect is important. 19 When Medicare reduced its payments to
hospitals, they appeared to respond by reducing their20 capacity
(e.g., by decreasing their number of beds for inpatients).
Rather than cost-shifting from the government to the private
sector, we may see a significant cost shift in the opposite
direction. A major question about the ACA is the extent to which
the expansion of governmental health care benefits will "crowd
out" private health care insurance. 21 That is, when government
health care programs expand, they reach not only previously
uninsured Americans but also Americans for whom it is less
expensive to use the government program than to continue
relying on the private sector. When Congress expanded Medicaid
through the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP)
program, some low-income families dropped their private
insurance and enrolled their children in CHIP. 22 With the ACA,
many Americans may replace their employer-sponsored health
care with Medicaid or federally subsidized coverage purchased on
a health insurance exchange. Indeed, some Americans may have
17.
Id. at 6 & n.11. The difference in findings reflects different ways to measure
hospital charges. Chapin White, Contrary to Cost-Shift Theory, Lower Medicare Hospital
Payment Rates for Inpatient Care Lead to Lower Private Payment Rates, 32 HEALTH AFF.
935, 941 (2013).
18.
Id. at 941. To be sure, reductions in fees for hospital care may still lead to
increases in spending if hospitals compensate for the lower reimbursement rates by
increasing the volume of services provided. Id. at 941-42.
See Chapin White & Tracy Yee, When Medicare Cuts Hospital Prices, Seniors
19.
Use Less Inpatient Care,32 HEALTH AFF. 1789, 1794 (2013).
Id.
20.
21.
See Matt Broaddus & January Angeles, Medicaid Expansion in Health Reform
Not Likely to "Crowd Out"PrivateInsurance, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (June
22, 2010), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=3218 (addressing the debate over
whether the new law will "shift people who already have private coverage to Medicaid"
and concluding that it will not). But see Richard Kronick & Todd Gilmer, Insuring LowIncome Adults: Does Public Coverage Crowd Out Private?, HEALTH AFF., Jan. 2002, at
225, 235 (concluding that pre-ACA expansion of public coverage in four states led to
crowding out "among persons with incomes 100-200 percent of poverty").
22.
See Lisa Dubay & Genevieve Kenney, The Impact of CHIP on Children's
Insurance Coverage: An Analysis Using the National Survey of America's Families, 44
HEALTH SERVICES RES. 2040, 2053-54 (2009) (noting that CHIP led to both a 14%-20%
increase in public coverage and a 7% decline in employer-sponsored insurance).

1062

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[51:4

no choice but to make such a switch. For some companies, it will
make a good deal of economic sense to stop providing health care
coverage as an employee benefit and let their workers receive
health care coverage as an ACA benefit. Consider, for example, a
business that mostly employs low-income workers. If the workers
can receive health care coverage for free or at a very low cost, the
employer can drop health care coverage without having to
23
compensate employees with higher wages.
A substantial crowd-out effect could raise serious problems
for the viability of the ACA. When public programs displace
private purchases, the public fisc takes a hit, and, at some point,
the increase in costs becomes unsustainable. 24 So far, projections
by expert analysts do not suggest a major crowd-out problem, 25
but projections can miss the mark. Over the next few years, data
on the extent of crowd out will be important.
III. THE HALL DATA
Professor Hall provides important information on a number of
questions. For example, the "medical loss ratio" requirements have
done much good. 26 Insurance companies are devoting a higher
percentage of their premium dollars to medical care for their
customers rather than to administrative overhead or profit. 27 The
public is getting a bigger bang for its health care buck.
That said, the effects were uneven. The greatest consumer
benefit occurred in the individual market, where insurers cut
23.
Companies with higher-income employees would not benefit by dropping health
care coverage. Their employees would not qualify for subsidies to purchase health care
coverage and would demand higher wages to cover their health care insurance costs. See
26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(3)(A)(i) (2012) (allowing subsidies only where household income is less
than or equal to 400% of the federal poverty level). Moreover, the increase in wages would
be higher than the savings on health care insurance for the employer since pre-tax dollars
are used to pay for employer-sponsored coverage while after-tax dollars would be needed
to pay for insurance on an ACA exchange. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO AND JCT's
ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ON THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE
OBTAINING EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE 11-16 (2012), available at

http://cbo.gov/sites/default/fiLes/cbofiles/attachments/03-15-ACA -and -Insurance-2.pdf
(contrasting employer-sponsored coverage and individual-purchased exchange coverage).
24.
GESTUR DAVIDSON, LYNN A. BLEWErT & KATHLEEN THIEDE CALL, ROBERT
WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., PUBLIC PROGRAM CROWD-OUT OF PRIVATE COVERAGE: WHAT ARE

THE ISSUES? 11-12 (2004), available at http://www.rwjf.org/content/damfarm/reports/
issuebriefs/2004/rwjf17965/subassetsrwjf17965_1.
25.
Thomas Buchmueller, Colleen Carey & Helen G. Levy, Will Employers Drop
Health Insurance Coverage Because of the Affordable Care Act?, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1522,
1522, 1526, 1528 (2013); see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 23, at 4-7, 17, tbl.2.
26. Medical loss ratio refers to the "portion of premium dollars a health insurer uses
to pay for medical care or for health care quality improvement, as opposed to profits,
administrative costs, or sales expenses." Hall, supranote 1, at 1048.
27. Id.
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both their administrative costs and their profits and thereby
substantially reduced their overhead costs. 28 In the small and
large group markets, administrative cost savings were
29
converted into greater profits.
Hall also considers the impact of the ACA on health care
insurance premiums. So far, concerns that ACA regulations
would drive up health care premiums have not materialized.
30
The impact of ACA regulations on premiums has been small.
Premiums have continued to increase but mostly because
charging
doctors and hospitals are providing more care and
31
ACA.
the
of
because
than
more to provide it rather
And early data on exchange premiums are generally
reassuring. According to a September 2013 report by the U.S.
Department of Health & Human Services (HHS), premiums for
single enrollees are generally coming in below earlier
projections.3 2 The HHS report compared actual exchange
premiums with an earlier HHS estimate for the average
premium nationwide. 33 In most states, average premiums are
reportedly below the projected national average, often by more
34
than 20%.
Averages, however, can mask important variations, and an
October 2013 New York Times analysis found big differences in
health insurance costs between states and among different counties
in a state) 5 In Georgia, for example, premiums are twice as high in
28.
MCCUE & HALL, supranote 16, at 4.
See id. at 4-6.
29.
See Hall, supranote 1, at 1047-48 (noting that premium rate increases "covered only
30.
about 5%-10% of the individual and small group markets nationally').
See id. ('Medical costs were the main drivers of these increases, based both on
31.
increasing use of medical services and increased unit prices."). Of course, as Hall observes, his
analysis is based on data collection that occurred before the ACA's guaranteed issue and
community rating provisions took effect. Id. at 1054 (noting that the ACA's major provisions
only came into effect in January 2014 and that at least two years will be required to determine
the effects of the ACA's rules and subsidies).
See ASPE OFFICE OF HEALTH POLICY, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH
32.
INSURANCE MARKETPLACE PREMIUMS FOR 2014, at 2-3, 5 (2013), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reportsl2013/marketplacepremiums/ib-premiumslandscape.pdf
(determining that 95% of "uninsured potentially eligible for the Marketplaces live in states
with average premiums below.., projected premiums').
33.
See id. (comparing exchange premiums against CBO premium projections).
34.
See id. at 5 (finding that at least 39% of uninsured Americans potentially eligible for
insurance in the forty-eight states providing premium data can secure premiums 20% or more
below the CBO estimate). In a February 2014 report, the CBO lowered its 2014 estimates for
exchange-purchased insurance by 15%. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC
at
available
(2014),
114
B,
at
app.
2024
TO
2014
OUTLOOK:
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/f les/cbofiles/attachments/45010-Outlook2Ol4 - Feb.pdf.
35.
Abelson, Thomas & McGinty, supra note 6 (observing that varying degrees of
competition between insurers in more populous regions versus rural and small town
communities can translate into disparities in plan premium costs).
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rural Baker County-which is in the southwest corner of the
state-as in Atlanta. 36 The higher-cost counties and states tend to
have only one or two insurers competing for business while the
lower-cost counties and states tend to have three or more insurers
37
competing for business.
While lack of competition is a problem in many parts of the
country, Hall's data on the number of insurers suggest that
problems with weak competition predate the ACA. 38 There have
been reductions in the number of insurers since the ACA's
enactment, but the reductions are modest. 39 The ACA appears to be
falling short more by not promoting greater competition than by
decreasing the level of competition.
But even if the ACA is not increasing premiums through
burdensome regulations or decreased competition among insurers,
it may still disappoint. The ACA's goal was not simply to avoid
causing health care costs to rise. Its authors sought to "bend the
cost curve" so that health care spending would rise more slowly and
perhaps even decline over time. So far, it is not clear that the costsaving provisions in the ACA will have a substantial impact.
Indeed, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services estimated
that once the ACA was fully implemented, health care spending
would rise at an annual rate of 6.7% instead of 6.8%.40
And some of the cost-cutting provisions of the ACA may be
counterproductive. For example, the ACA encourages the
36.
Id.
37.
Id. (providing as an example a comparison of higher-cost Wyoming, with two
carriers, and lower-cost Montana, with three).
38. See Hall, supra note 1, at 1041-42 (observing that between 2011 and 2012, the
number of insurers with at least 1,000 members declined only 11% in the individual
market and 6% in the small group market).
39.
See id. ("[T]here has been only a modest reduction so far in the number of
insurers with 1,000 or more members in each market segment.").
40.
Andrea M. Sisko et al., National Health Spending Projections: The Estimated
Impact of Reform Through 2019, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1933, 1936 (2010) (citing CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS 20092019, at tbl.1 (2010), available at http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-andSystems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/downloadsNhE
projections2009to2019.pdf). Some observers have cited the moderating of health care costs
in the past few years as evidence that the ACA is indeed "bending the [cost] curve." See
Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Obamacare's Secret Success, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2013, at A33.
But the moderation in costs began before enactment of the ACA and more likely reflects
other factors, including a reduction in demand for health care by patients because of the
economic recession and because of a pre-ACA trend of employers and insurers requiring
individuals to pay a higher share of their health care costs. See, e.g., Alexander J. Ryu et
al., The Slowdown in Health Care Spending in 2009-11 Reflected Factors Other than the
Weak Economy and Thus May Persist,32 HEALTH AFF. 835, 835-38 (2013) (examining job
loss and diminished employer plan generosity as factors potentially influencing the health
care spending slowdown, but expressing "cautious optimism" that the spending slowdown
may be more than temporary).
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formation of accountable care organizations (ACOs) as a vehicle
for promoting higher-quality, lower-cost care. 4 1 ACOs bring
hospitals, doctors, and other health care providers together to
provide integrated health care to patients. 42 ACOs look a lot like
health maintenance organizations (HMOs), and the public
rejected the cost-saving policies of HMOs. 43 Moreover, rather
than driving costs down, ACOs may drive them up. 44 By
promoting consolidation among physicians, hospitals, and other
health care providers, ACOs will enjoy much greater market
45
power than their components could exert standing alone.
IV.

THE FUTURE OF THE

ACA

As we go forward and collect even more data about the
impact of the ACA, we will be able to get a better handle on the
effectiveness of ACA reforms. In the meantime, we can make
some fairly safe assumptions. Almost certainly, the ACA will
make the individual health insurance market work better.
Insurers will no longer be able to charge higher premiums or
46
deny coverage for people with preexisting medical conditions.
Also, the ACA's subsidies for the purchase of insurance will
ensure that coverage is affordable for most purchasers of
individual health care plans.47 The ACA also will turn Medicaid
41.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)-(b) (2012) (providing for and establishing standards
for ACOs).
42.
See Thomas L. Greaney, Accountable Care Organizations:The Fork in the Road,
364 NEW ENG. J. MED. el(l), el(l) (2011), http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/
NEJMp1013404 ("ACOs are best understood as affiliations of health care providers that
are held jointly accountable for achieving improvements in the quality of care and
reductions in spending.").
43.
See David Orentlicher, The Rise and Fall of Managed Care: A Predictable
"Tragic Choices" Phenomenon, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 411, 411 (2003); see also Ezekiel J.
Emanuel, Why Accountable Care OrganizationsAre Not 1990s Managed Care Redux, 307
JAMA 2263, 2263 (2012). Some observers believe that sufficient differences exist between
ACOs and HMOs such that the experience with ACOs will be much better. See id. at
2263-64.
44.
See Greaney, supra note 42, at el(1)-el(2) (noting that ACOs may encourage
mergers and other joint ventures that increase market concentration and escalate health
insurance costs, and citing studies showing that hospital mergers in the 1990s increased
inpatient prices anywhere from 50/o-40%).
See id. (observing that "[a]necdotal evidence suggests that health care reform
45.
legislation has already prompted a number of mergers among health care providers" and
that such market concentration "has been a major factor spurring escalation in the cost of
health insurance").
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-3(a), 300gg-4(b)(1) (prohibiting preexisting condition
46.
exclusions or other discrimination based on health status).
47.
See id. § 18071 (providing for federal subsidies in support of insurance
purchases for eligible individuals). Out of a potential market of 28,605,000 residents,
more than 17,000,000 will be tax credit eligible. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., STATEBY-STATE ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE ELIGIBLE FOR PREMIUM TAx CREDITS
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into a better program for indigent Americans. By expanding
eligibility to include all persons with a family income up to 138%
of the federal poverty level, 48 Medicaid will reach all poor
Americans rather than just those who are poor and young, poor
and pregnant, poor and a caretaker of children, or poor and
disabled. 49 For the millions of Americans who do not have access
to good employer-sponsored insurance and who are too poor to
buy their own policy, the ACA will do much good.
However, the ACA will almost certainly fall short in many
ways. For example, the ACA will not result in universal access to
coverage. The Medicaid expansion and individual market reforms
are game changers, but they are not comprehensive in their
reach. Insurance will remain too pricey for many people, and
gaps in coverage will remain. While making Medicaid and the
private insurance market work better are very good reforms, they
cannot achieve all that could be achieved by switching to a public
50
insurance program such as Medicare-for-all.
There is an even bigger problem with the orientation of ACA
reform. Access to health care insurance is important, but it is
important not as an end in itself. Rather it is important as a means
to better health. And the link between having health care insurance
and being healthy is more tenuous than one might think. It is not
difficult to find anecdotes that illustrate the importance of health
care coverage, 51 and it is true that people with good health care
UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 3 tbl.1 (2013), available at http://kaiserfamily
foundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/8509-state-by-state-estimates-of-the-numberof-people-eligible-for-premium-tax-credits.pdf.
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VII) (establishing Medicaid eligibility for those
whose income does not exceed 133% of the poverty line). In addition, 5% of an applicant's
income is disregarded, effectively raising the eligibility threshold to 138%. CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION 7 n.13 (2012), available at

http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/filestcbofiles/attachments/43472-07-24-2012.
CoverageEstimates.pdf.
49. See David Orentlicher, NFIB v. Sebelius: Proportionality in the Exercise of
CongressionalPower, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 463, 466. There is an important caveat to this point.
Recall that the U.S. Supreme Court held that states can decline to participate in the Medicaid
expansion while still participating in pre-ACA Medicaid. Natl Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603, 2607 (2012). To the extent that states do not participate in Medicaid
expansion, many poor persons will continue to lack access to health care insurance.
50.
According to estimates, more than 20 million Americans will remain uninsured even
if every state adopts the Medicaid expansion. See CBO's Analysis of the Major Health Care
Legislation Enacted in March 2010: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm.
on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. 17 (2011) (statement of Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director,
Cong.
Budget
Office),
available
at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
cbofiles/ftpdocs/121xx/dcl2119/03-30-healthcarelegislation.pdf. Many of those who will remain
uninsured are undocumented immigrants. Id.
51.
See, e.g., Michael Stillman & Monalisa Tailor, Dead Man Walking, 369 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1880, 1880 (2013) (describing a patient whose cancer diagnosis was delayed for many
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insurance are healthier than are the uninsured. For example, one
study found that the uninsured have a mortality rate 40% higher
than that of the insured. 52 Another study found that having health
insurance increased the likelihood that a person would report a very
53
good or excellent health status.
Nevertheless, the insured and uninsured differ in many
important ways other than in their access to health care,
including wealth and education. These other differences may
explain differences in health much more than do the differences
in health insurance status.
Indeed, a study from Oregon suggests that insurance
matters less than expected. In 2008, Oregon was able to expand
its Medicaid program, but only for a limited number of persons. 54
While there was a waiting list of almost 90,000 people for the
Medicaid program, 55 there were only slots for only about 10,000
additional people. 56 The State decided to allocate the new slots
through a lottery. 57 As a result, Oregon effectively created a
randomized controlled study of the benefits of Medicaid coverage.
Applicants who won the lottery and received Medicaid coverage
could be compared with applicants who lost the lottery and
remained uninsured.
In 2013, researchers reported their first round of data on
health outcomes, 58 and the results were sobering. The study
analyzed data for the first two years of the expansion, and the
researchers looked at outcomes for persons with high blood
pressure, elevated cholesterol, diabetes, or depression. 59 Medicaid
coverage resulted in greater utilization of the health care system,
months because of his inability to afford care); Allan R. Gold, The Struggle to Make Do Without
Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1989, at 1 (relating stories of uninsured Americans,
including one of a pregnant woman who attempted to drive eighty-four miles during labor to a
free clinic, which led to severe brain damage and the eventual death of her child).
52.
Andrew P. Wilper et al., Health Insurance and Mortality in US Adults, 99 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 2289, 2293 tbl.2 (2009).
53.
See Jack Hadley & Timothy Waidmann, Health Insuranceand Health at Age 65:
Implications for Medical Care Spending on New Medicare Beneficiaries, 41 HEALTH
SERVICES RES. 429, 442 (2006) (finding increases in very good health status from 29.8% to
as much as 33.9%, and from 13.3% to as much as 16.6% for excellent health status).
54.
Amy Finkelstein et al., The Oregon Health InsuranceExperiment: Evidence from
the First Year, 127 Q.J. ECON. 1057, 1063 (2012) (explaining that state budget constraints
limited Oregon's Medicaid expansion efforts).
55.
Id. at 1058, 1063. Not everyone on the waiting list actually satisfied all of the
eligibility requirements of the Medicaid program. Id. at 1064.
56.
Id. at 1063.
57.
Id.
58.
See Katherine Baicker et al., The Oregon Experiment: Effects of Medicaid on
Clinical Outcomes, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1713, 1715-18 (2013) (surveying over 12,000
people covered by Medicaid for a range of clinical conditions).
59.
Id. at 1714-15.
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more individual self-reports of better health, and less financial
strain. 60 However, there was no reduction in levels of hypertension,
high cholesterol, or diabetes. 6 1 There was a reduction in levels of
depression, but no increase in the extent to which participants
reported being happy. 62 Perhaps it takes more than two years to
show significant benefits from being insured, but one would have
expected more of an impact from the Medicaid expansion.
Another careful study also casts doubt on the link between
insurance status and health. The study collected data on people
nationwide who were age 50-61 in 1992 and looked at their health
outcomes for the next 18 years. 63 While insured individuals used
more health care resources than did uninsured persons, there was
no evidence that being insured lowered the risk of death 12-14
years into the study and only mild evidence of a mortality benefit
at 16-18 years. 64 As the study authors observed, even the mild
benefit may have reflected unmeasured factors (e.g., diet or
exercise habits) rather than health insurance status. 65 By 16-18
years into the study, everyone would have become a Medicare
recipient, and many of the study subjects would have become
Medicare eligible much earlier. 66 Indeed, the oldest study subjects
67
would have spent 14 out of their 18 study years on Medicare.
One would expect risk of death to have declined rather than
increased once the uninsured persons became insured under
Medicare, but their mortality rate rose only after they enrolled in
Medicare. 68 Other study results suggest that the lower risk of
death for the insured resulted from factors other than insurance
status. For example, people who had public insurance had higher
69
mortality rates than did the uninsured.
To be sure, other studies have found improvements in health
status that were related to improvements in insurance status. In
60. Id. at 1717-18.
61.
Id. at 1715-16 (finding, however, an increase in the diagnosis rate and "us[e of]
medications for diabetes").
62.
Id. at 1716-18.
63.
Bernard Black et al., The Effect of Health Insurance on Near-Elderly Health and
Mortality 7, 17 (Northwestern Univ. Law Sch., Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 12-09,
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2103669. The
authors looked at this "near-elderly" population because a beneficial effect of insurance
would most likely be found in that group-younger people are healthier, and older people
are covered by Medicare. Id. at 1.
64. Id. at 1-2, 7, 15-19.
65. Id. at 2, 24.
66. Id. at 7.
67.
See id. at 3.
68. Id. at 15, 22 & n.31.
69. Id. at 15. Public insurance included Medicaid, Medicare, and Veterans Affairs
health care. Id. at 8.
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one study, for example, researchers compared three states that had
expanded their Medicaid programs between 2000 and 2005 to
include "childless adults" with neighboring states that were similar
demographically but had not undertaken similar expansions of
their Medicaid programs. 70 The states with the expansions saw a
significant reduction in mortality rates compared to the neighboring
states.7 1 Another study found a significant decrease in mortality
rates for patients with emergency needs for health care once
72
Medicare kicked in at age sixty-five.
But none of the studies finding benefits from access to health
care insurance involved the rigor of the Oregon Medicaid study.
That is, because they were not randomized controlled studies, the
differences in health status between insured and uninsured persons
may have reflected factors other than differences in insurance
73
status.
There are other good reasons to discount the studies finding a
health benefit from insurance. In the Medicaid expansion study,
only one of the three expansion states experienced a significant
decrease in mortality, 74 and the decline was too large to be
explained by the reduction in the number of uninsured.7 5 Similarly,
in the study of Medicare patients with emergency needs for health
care, the decrease in mortality was too large to be explained by
changes in care for the small percentage of Americans who moved
76
from being uninsured to being insured at age sixty-five.
Other data also suggest that the connection between health
care insurance and health is more tenuous than one might
expect. Researchers have studied health outcomes in England
under that country's universal National Health Service (NHS),
and the data indicate that socioeconomic status is much more
important for health than is access to health care.7 7 For example,
70.
Benjamin D. Sommers, Katherine Baicker & Arnold M. Epstein, Mortality and
Access to Care Among Adults After State Medicaid Expansions, 367 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1025, 1026 (2012).
71.
Id. at 1029-31.
72.
David Card, Carlos Dobkin & Nicole Maestas, Does Medicare Save Lives?, 124
Q.J. ECON. 597, 597, 621-24 (2009).
73.
Sommers, Baicker & Epstein, supra note 70, at 1032.
74.
That is, while there was a significant mortality decrease when the expansion
states were compared as a group with the neighboring states, there was a significant
decrease in only one state when each state was compared separately with its neighboring
state(s).
75.
Black et al., supra note 63, at 6.
76.
Card, Dobkin & Maestas, supra note 72, at 597-98, 632-33.
77.
Michael Marmot, Multilevel Approaches to UnderstandingSocial Determinants,
in SOCIAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 349, 365 (Lisa F. Berkman & Ichiro Kawachi eds., 2000); see
The History of the NHS in England, NHS, http://www.nhs.ukfNHSEngland/thenhs/
nhshistory/Pages/NHShistoryl948.aspx (last updated June 24, 2013).
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the higher the socioeconomic status of a person, the lower the
mortality rate. 78 People in the highest civil service grade for
government employees have a mortality rate about half that of
people in the lowest civil service grade, even though they all have
good access to health care. 79 In addition, the gap in mortality
rates among men in England by socioeconomic status has
actually widened over time since the introduction of the NHS in
1948.80
A number of other studies reinforce the link between
socioeconomic status and health status. These studies have found
that improvements in socioeconomic status lead to improvements
in health status. For example, consider an interesting policy
experiment in Canada during the 1970s.8 1 For four years, the
province of Manitoba guaranteed a minimum annual income for
all residents of Dauphin, a small, rural city. 82 At any one time,
only about a third of the city's residents received payments from
the provincial government, and for many of those people, the
payments were small. 83 Nevertheless, everyone benefited from
the program in the sense that it provided "income security"everyone knew that whatever happened to their income stream,
they could expect a basic annual income. This security would
have been particularly valuable in Dauphin because it was an
agricultural community where incomes depended on harvest
sizes and commodity prices that could vary substantially from
year to year. 84 Thus, for example, farming families could be more
comfortable letting their older children remain in school rather
85
than work at home.
With the income security from the Manitoba policy, health
status improved significantly. When Dauphin residents were
compared with residents of other rural communities in Manitoba,
78.
Marmot, supra note 77, at 349-50.
Id. at 349-51 & tbl.15-1. Taking into account differences in smoking rates,
79.
cholesterol, blood pressure, exercise, and height explained no more than a third of the
gradient. Id. at 362-63 & fig.15-10.
Gopal Sreenivasan, Health Care and Equality of Opportunity, HASTINGS
80.
CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 2007, at 21, 25-26 (citing Douglas Black et al., The Black Report,
in INEQUALITIES IN HEALTH 29, 59 tbl.7 (Peter Townsend & Nick Davidson eds., 3d ed.
1992)); Margaret Whitehead, The Health Divide, in INEQUALITIES IN HEALTH, supra, at
215, 231.
Evelyn L. Forget, Commentary, The Town with No Poverty: The Health Effects
81.
of a Canadian Guaranteed Annual Income Field Experiment, 37 CANADIAN PUB. POL'Y
283, 289 (2011).
Id. at 288-90. Some residents of Winnipeg also received a guaranteed minimum
82.
income. Id.
83. Id. at 291.
84. See id. at 289-90.
85. See id. at 291-92.
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the data showed that while people in Dauphin were more likely
to be hospitalized before implementation of the minimum income
program, the gap in hospitalization rates disappeared by the end
occurred for
of the program.8 6 This decline largely
hospitalizations that tend to be sensitive to levels of income
security.8 7 For example, accidents and injuries are more common
for people who are income insecure.8 8 Income insecurity makes
people more likely to continue working when fatigued, increase
their alcohol intake, or not hire caretakers who can protect their
children from accidents.8 9 Just as overall hospitalization rates
were higher in Dauphin before the minimum income program, so
were hospitalizations for accidents and injury, and just as the
gap in overall hospitalization rates disappeared during the
program, so did the gap in hospitalizations for accidents and
injuries. 90 The results were the same for hospitalizations for
anxiety disorders, depression, and other mental health
conditions. 91 In sum, providing income security to Dauphin
residents made them less likely to need hospital care.
Note that the improvements in health status cannot be
attributed to better access to health insurance. One might
wonder whether providing a minimum income made it more
possible for poor residents of Dauphin to purchase health care
coverage. However, Manitoba had implemented a program of
universal health insurance before the minimum income
experiment, so the income benefits did not affect health
92
insurance status.
Other studies also illustrate the value of socioeconomic
interventions for promoting health. In one U.S. study, chronically
homeless individuals with serious alcohol abuse problems were
given housing. 93 Previous studies had shown that the provision of
housing reduced hospital admissions and shortened the duration
of hospitalizations for homeless persons. 94 This study found that
health care costs dropped by more than 50% in the first six
86.
Id. at 294-95 & fig. 2.
Evelyn L. Forget, New Questions, New Data, Old Interventions: The Health
87.
Effects of a GuaranteedAnnual Income, 57 PREVENTIVE MED. 925, 926-27 (2013).
88.
Sandra J. McIsaac & Richard G. Wilkinson, Income Distribution and CauseSpecific Mortality, 7 EUR. J. PUB. HEALTH 45, 49 & tbl.6 (1997).
89.
Forget, supra note 81, at 296.
Id. at 295-97.
90.
91.
Id. at 297.
92.
Id. at 299.
93.
Mary E. Larimer et al., Health Care and Public Service Use and Costs Before
and After Provision of Housing for Chronically Homeless Persons with Severe Alcohol
Problems, 301 JAMA 1349, 1350 (2009).
94.
Id. at 1349.
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months after the chronically homeless persons were placed in
their new homes, 95 and health care costs continued to be lower
96
through the full twelve months of the study.
Why might socioeconomic status be much more important than
health insurance status for health? Does health care not matter for
health status? No, health care does matter.97 Undoubtedly, the
health of uninsured persons would be worse if they lacked access to
health care entirely. But the uninsured receive some care, whether
in emergency departments, other hospital settings, free clinics, or
community health centers. Having good insurance makes for more
health care, but not necessarily for better health. 98 Indeed, more
health care can be harmful to one's health. Many people with good
insurance receive care that in hindsight turns out to provide no
benefit but significant risks to health (e.g., postmenopausal women
who received hormone-replacement therapy).99 In addition, it may
be true that health insurance is a necessary, but not sufficient,
factor in improving a person's health. That is, the uninsured face
many barriers to receiving good health care, and they often may
need other kinds of assistance to ensure that they realize the full
benefits of health care coverage. For example, patients who are poor
and poorly educated may need help navigating the health care
system.100
Even to the extent that health care makes for better
health, the impact of more health care is limited. It is not at
all surprising that the ACA may fall short in terms of
improving people's health. The ACA put most of its money on
treatment, 101 and that was not a wise bet. It has long been
clear that public health interventions do far more to promote
10 2
health than do treatments of disease.
95.
Id. at 1353 (reporting that "[i]ndividual median costs" decreased from $4,066
per month to $1,492 per month over a six-month period).
96.
Id.
97.
According to one estimate, medical care was responsible for about one-sixth of
the increase in life expectancy between 1900 and 1995 in the United States and about
one-half of the increase between 1950 and 1995. John P. Bunker, The Role of Medical
Care in Contributingto Health Improvements Within Societies, 30 INT'L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY
1260, 1261 (2001).
98.
Black et al., supra note 63, at 3.
99.
Id. at 22, 24.
100.
Harold P. Freeman, Op-Ed., Why Black Women Die of Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
14, 2014, at A27.
101.
See CBO's Analysis of the Major Health Care Legislation Enacted in March
2010, supra note 50, at 3 (statement of Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, Cong. Budget
Office) (recognizing that the ACA's budget increases serve to expand health care coverage
while other provisions reduce spending and increase revenue).
102.
Thomas R. Frieden, A Framework for Public Health Action: The Health Impact
Pyramid,100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 590, 590 (2010).
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For example, better funding of tobacco cessation programs
would do much to reduce cigarette smoking and the cancers or other
diseases that it causes in smokers. The ACA provides some funding
for tobacco cessation through its Prevention and Public Health
Fund,10 3 but the fund was supposed to provide only $2 billion a year
for all programs, including tobacco cessation, by 2015; Congress
already has cut back on the amount of funding, so the fund will not
reach the $2 billion level until 2022.104 With more dollars, the ACA
could have ensured that each state meets the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention's recommended level of spending for tobacco
cessation programs. While recommended spending for all states is
less than $4 billion per year, states only spend 13% of the
l0 5
recommended amount, according to a December 2013 report.
In addition to improving the health of smokers, better
tobacco legislation could protect nonsmokers. In particular,
second-hand smoking bans in states without them would do
much to reduce hospital admissions for heart attacks, strokes,
and asthma among nonsmokers. 10 6 The ACA could have given
states financial incentives to pass second-hand smoking bans.
To be sure, the ACA does not ignore public health needs, and
some of its provisions will be very helpful. For example, health
insurance must cover the full costs of immunizations, colonoscopies,
mammograms, tobacco cessation treatments, and other important
preventive measures. 10 7 In addition, the Prevention and Public
Health Fund will provide valuable support even though its eventual
$2 billion per year is not a substantial amount of money.
103.
42 U.S.C. § 300u-11 (2012); see also AM. LUNG ASS'N, TOBACCO CONTROL AND
THE PREVENTION AND PUBLIC HEALTH FUND 1 (2012), available at http://www.lung.org/
stop-smoking/tobacco-control-advocacy/reports-resources/2012/factsheet-prevention-and
public-health-fund.pdf.
ASS'N,
PUB. HEALTH
Prevention and Public Health Fund, AM.
104.
http://www.apha.org/advocacy/Health+Reform/PH+Fund/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2014). In
its 2014 fiscal year budget, Congress eliminated all of the fund's allocation for that year.
Eric Lipton & Jonathan Weisman, $1.1 Trillion Bill to Avoid Federal Shutdown Covers
Many Local Interests, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2014, at A16.
CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, BROKEN PROMISES TO OUR CHILDREN: THE
105.
1998 STATE TOBACCO SETTLEMENT 15 YEARS LATER i, x (2013), available at
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/content/what-we_do/state_local-issues/settlementFY2014
/StateSettlementReport_- FY2014.pdf; CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DEP'T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BEST PRACTICES FOR COMPREHENSIVE TOBACCO CONTROL
PROGRAMS 54 (2007), available at ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/fda/fda/BestPractices_Complete.
pdf.
Dariush Mozaffarian et al., Population Approaches to Improve Diet, Physical
106.
Activity, and Smoking Habits: A Scientific Statement From the American Heart
Association, 126 CIRCULATION 1514, 1546 (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a); see also Preventive Services Covered Under the
107.
Affordable Care Act, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/
facts/factsheets/2010/07/preventive-services-list.html (last updated Sept. 27, 2012).
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But other ACA provisions that are designed to promote health
rather than treat disease were poorly chosen. For example, there
are two key sections for wellness-the menu labeling requirements
for restaurants and the provisions encouraging employer wellness
programs.10 8 Unfortunately, the evidence suggests that the two
provisions may cause more harm than good. 109
The menu labeling mandate requires restaurants to
disclose calorie information for its foods and beverages, 110 and
it responds to an important gap in food labeling laws. While
foods purchased at a grocery store have carried nutritional
labeling since the 1990s,1 11 foods purchased at restaurants
generally have not. And Americans are eating more of their
meals away from their homes than they did in the past. 112
With restaurant meals "typically higher in calories and fat"
than meals made at home, 113 many people may be eating too
much because they are not aware of how many calories they
are consuming. Even ostensibly healthy dining options, such
as salads, can contain calorie amounts that exceed those of a
McDonald's Big Mac.1 1 4 The ACA's menu labeling mandate rests
on a sensible premise-people will make healthier meal choices
when they are better informed about the calorie contents of the
different menu options.
But it turns out that more information about caloric content
does not result in lower calorie intake. 11 5 Other factors are much

108.
21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(H); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j).
109.
For more discussion of this point, see David Orentlicher, Health Care Reform
and Efforts to Encourage Healthy Choices by Individuals, 92 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming
2014). See also Micah L. Berman, A Public Health Perspectiveon Health CareReform, 21
HEALTH MATRIX 353, 367-68, 374-77 (2011).

110. 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(H). The definition of "food" includes beverages. Id.
§ 321(0(1).
111.
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat.
2353 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)).
112.
HAYDEN STEWART, NOEL BLISARD & DEAN JOLLIFFE, ECON. RESEARCH SERV.,
LET'S EAT OUT: AMERICANS WEIGH TASTE, CONVENIENCE, AND NUTRITION 1 (2006),

available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/ersDownloadHandler.ashx?file=/media/860870/eib
19.pdf ("USDA's food intake surveys show that between 1977-78 and 1994-96, the share
of daily caloric intake from food away from home increased from 18 percent to 32
percent.").
113.
Sara N. Bleich & Lainie Rutkow, Improving Obesity Prevention at the Local
Level-Emerging Opportunities,368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1761, 1761 (2013).
114.
Compare McDonald's USA Nutrition Facts for Popular Menu Items,
MCDONALD'S, http://www.nutrition.mcdonalds.com/getnutrition/nutritionfacts.pdf
(last
visited Feb. 23, 2014) (showing that a Big Mac contains 550 calories), with Nutrition
Facts, JACK

IN

THE

Box,

http://www.jackinthebox.com/food/documents/nutritional_

factsdocument (last visited Feb. 23, 2014) (showing that a Chicken Club Salad with
crispy chicken strips and bacon ranch dressing can exceed 700 calories).
115.
Berman, supra note 109, at 367-68; Orentlicher, supranote 109.
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more important than nutritional information. For example, it is
difficult for many people to decline the immediate enjoyment of
116
high-calorie food for the delayed benefit of a longer lifespan.
The government needs to do much more than require the
disclosure of calorie information if it wants to change the dietary
habits of Americans.
The menu labeling mandate may not provide much benefit,
but the wellness program provisions may actually cause harmthose provisions may undermine the ACA's goal of making health
care coverage affordable. 117 Wellness programs include
questionnaires about diet and exercise and measurements of
weight, blood pressure, and other markers of health to identify
when people are at risk for poor health." 8 Wellness programs
also include counseling about diet and exercise, smoking
cessation programs, and other interventions to help people lower
their risks for poor health."19 So far, so good. But employers are
permitted to establish targets for their employees to attain, such
as lower weight, lower blood pressure, or lower blood sugar, and
penalize those employees who fail to meet their targets by a
health insurance premium surcharge of up to 30% of the cost of
an individual insurance policy. 120 In other words, people with
preexisting medical conditions may have to pay 30% more for
their health care insurance than is paid by people without

116.
Kristin M. Madison, Kevin G. Volpp & Scott D. Halpern, The Law, Policy, and
Ethics of Employers' Use of Financial Incentives to Improve Health, 39 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 450, 452-54 (2011); Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, The Economics of
Immediate Gratification,13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 233, 234 (2000).
117.
See Berman, supra note 109, at 374-77 (arguing that the wellness program
provisions will impose significant costs on individuals with preexisting conditions in
contravention of the ACA's main purpose); Orentlicher, supra note 109.
118.
SOEREN MATTKE ET AL., WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS STUDY: FINAL
REPORT 21 (2013).
119.
Id. at 21-23.
120.
Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 78
Fed. Reg. 33,158, 33,176-77, 33,191 (June 3, 2013) (to be codified at 46 C.F.R. pts. 146
and 147). Thus if the total cost of coverage (including employer and employee
contributions) is $5,000, an employer could employ financial incentives up to $1,500. If
family members are eligible for the financial incentives, then the maximum incentive
would be 30% of the cost of family coverage. In addition to capping the amount of financial
incentives, the ACA includes other protections for employees. For example, ACA
regulations "require that health-contingent wellness programs be reasonably designed to
promote health or prevent disease," "not be overly burdensome, not be a subterfuge for
discriminating based on a health factor, and not be highly suspect in the method chosen
to promote health or prevent disease." Id. at 33,159, 33,162; see also Jill R. Horwitz,
Brenna D. Kelly & John E. DiNardo, Wellness Incentives in the Workplace: Cost Savings
Through Cost Shifting to Unhealthy Workers, 32 HEALTH AFF. 468, 470 (2013). The ACA
also allows the Secretaries of Labor, Health and Human Services, and the Treasury to
raise the incentive cap from 30% to 50%. Madison, Volpp & Halpern, supra note 116, at
451 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A) (2012)).
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preexisting conditions. Ironically, as the ACA eliminates
12 1 it
preexisting condition surcharges in the individual market,
encourages premium variations in the group market on the basis
of personal health status. Discrimination on the basis of
preexisting conditions may appear in group plans as it
122
disappears in individual plans.
V. CONCLUSION
What can we draw from all of this? It may be that the
benefits of the ACA lie much more on their benefit for economic
health than physical health. Support for the ACA was driven in
large part by concerns about the extent to which health care costs
were overwhelming family budgets. 123 Much attention was paid
to the fact that costly medical care was forcing many Americans
into bankruptcy. 12 4 According to one estimate, medical bills
played a significant role in more than half of all personal
bankruptcies in 2007.125 The ACA will greatly reduce the
financial burden on Americans caused by health care needs, and
126
this is valuable.

121.
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3(a).
122.
Matt Lamkin, Health Care Reform, Wellness Programs and the Erosion of
Informed Consent, 101 KY. L.J. 435, 444-45 (2013). The Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) does not appear to offer much protection from these premium surcharges. Under
the ADA, insurance enjoys a generous exemption from the Act's antidiscrimination
provisions. Id. § 12201(c); see Seff v. Broward Cnty., 691 F.3d 1221, 1223-24 (11th Cir.
2012); Michelle M. Mello & Meredith B. Rosenthal, Wellness Programs and Lifestyle
Discrimination-TheLegal Limits, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 192, 194-95 (2008).
123.
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Affordable Care Act
(May 10, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/
05/10/remarks-president-affordable-care-act) (remarking that the ACA was created in

part to relieve "the stress of trying to manage a family budget when health care costs are
impinging on it").
124. See, e.g., Jim Dwyer, Without Health Care, One Burger from Ruin, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 2009, at MB1; Nicholas D. Kristof, Until Medical Bills Do Us Part,N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 30, 2009, at WK8; Kevin Sack, From the Hospital Room to Bankruptcy Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 25, 2009, at Al.
125. David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007:
Results of a National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 743 (2009).
126. Krugman, supra note 40. For many people, however, financial burdens will
remain even after the ACA is fully implemented. The subsidies to purchase individual
plans on health insurance exchanges phase out at 400% of the federal poverty level, and
some people just above 400% of the poverty level will have trouble affording their health
insurance. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(3)(A)(i); see also Richard Kirsch, The Politicsof Obamacare:
Health Care, Money, and Ideology, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1737, 1745-46 (2013). In
addition, deductibles are quite high in many of the health exchange plans, and satisfying
the deductibles will be a problem for a number of people. Pear, supra note 2.
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There is a second important way that the ACA will benefit the
economic health of Americans. The United States currently suffers
from a high degree of income inequality. The share of national
income received by the 10% of families with the highest incomes
has reached an all-time high since data were first collected in
1917.127 For the first time, the top 10% of families take in more
than 50% of total national income. 128 And of the total growth in
income since the Great Recession, the top 1% of families claimed
95% of the increase (people who take in more than $394,000 a
year).129 High levels of income inequality slow economic growth,
130
stifle socioeconomic mobility, and fuel political polarization.
While government policies over the past few decades have
contributed to the growth in income inequality (e.g., through the
reduction in income tax rates at the high end), the ACA provides
an important degree of wealth redistribution. 13 1 For example,
there will be an additional 0.9% Medicare payroll tax on earnings
above $200,000/$250,000.132 These high earners also are subject to
the full 3.8% Medicare payroll tax on the lesser of their net
investment income and the amount of their earnings above the
$200,000/$250,000 level. 133 For the average household taking in
more than $1 million this year, the tax bill will rise by $46,000.134
The ACA's contribution to income equality may do much to
improve the welfare of all Americans.
I will close with some observations about the highly
controversial nature of the ACA. 135 Clearly, a large part the
opposition reflects the fact that we live in a highly polarized
political environment. Support of or opposition to the ACA by
127.
Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United
States (Updated with 2012 Preliminary Estimates) 1 (Sept. 3, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/-saez/saez-UStopincomes-2012.pdf.
128.
Id.
129.
Id. at 3-4.
130.
David Brodwin, Suffering Under the Weight of Inequality, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/opinionblogs/economic-intelligence/
2013/09/12/record-high-income-inequality-threatens-us-growth; see also ANDREW G. BERG
& JONATHAN D. OSTRY, IMF, INEQUALITY AND UNSUSTAINABLE GROWTH: TWO SIDES OF

THE SAME COIN? 9, 11, 17 (2011), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft
sdn12011/sdnl108.pdf.
131.
David Leonhardt, In the Process, Pushing Back at Inequality, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
24, 2010, at Al.
132.
26 U.S.C. § 3101(b)(2) (2012). The $200,000 threshold applies to individual
taxpayers, while the $250,000 threshold applies to people filing a joint tax return. Id.
133.
Id. § 1411(a)-(b).
134.
Leonhardt, supra note 131.
135.
More than 3.5 years after the ACA's enactment, more than half of all Americans
still disapproved of the law, including more than half of the uninsured. See Abby
Goodnough & Allison Kopicki, Uninsured Skeptical of Health Care Law in Poll, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2013, at Al.
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members of Congress and the public has reflected party
affiliation much more than the substance of the ACA.136
But I also worry that the ACA is controversial because it
seems to depart from the traditional model for federal health
programs. Historically, coverage has been provided not to
everyone, but only to those who are viewed as being "deserving"
of assistance. 137 Medicare is a program for seniors who have
greater health care needs because of their age and a diminished
ability to afford health care costs because of retirement. In other
words, seniors need help with their medical care costs through no
fault of their own. Moreover, seniors have contributed to their
Medicare benefits through payroll deduction while working.1 38
Medicaid originally was a program for the poor who were
children, pregnant, caretakers of children, or disabled. Medicaid
also was designed as a program for those who were unable to
afford health care through no fault of their own. Medicaid
recipients "were seen as not responsible for their predicament,
either because of age or infirmity or because of their childcare
39
obligations."1
The ACA seems to depart from the "deserving of assistance"
paradigm by providing assistance for all persons who do not
receive health coverage from their employers and cannot afford
the coverage on their own. The ACA makes these individuals
eligible for Medicaid or eligible for subsidized private health care
insurance.
An important question is whether ACA beneficiaries will
be viewed over time as sufficiently deserving of their
assistance because health care costs are unaffordable even for

136.
The U.S. Senate passed the ACA in a strict party-line vote. Robert Pear, Senate
Approves Health Care Bill in Party-Line Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2009, at Al. Not one
Republican in the U.S. House of Representatives voted for the ACA, while 87% of
Democrats did. See Robert Pear & David M. Herszenhorn, House Votes on Party Lines,
219 to 212, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2010, at Al. Public polling also shows substantial
differences by party affiliation. While 75% of Democrats approved of the ACA in
December 2013, only 10% of Republicans did. Frank Newport, Americans Slightly Less
Negative About Healthcare Law, GALLUP (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.gallup.compoll]166
283/americans-slightly-less-negative-healthcare-law.aspx.
137.
David Orentlicher, Rights to Healthcare in the United States: Inherently
Unstable, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 326, 330-31 (2012); see also Jonathan Oberlander, The
Politicsof Medicare Reform, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1095, 1111 (2003) (noting that public
sympathy for the "poorer" and "sicker" elderly led to older Americans receiving national
health care insurance ahead of younger citizens).
138.
Orentlicher, supra note 137, at 329.
139.
Id. at 331; see also Cindy Mann & Tim Westmoreland, Attending to Medicaid, 32
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 416, 418 (2004) (observing that the original Medicaid beneficiaries
included children and their caretakers, the elderly, and disabled groups "deemed too
vulnerable to provide insurance for themselves").
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many gainfully employed members of the middle class (e.g.,
the medical bankruptcy problem), or whether the ACA will
begin to unravel as persons with means become less willing to
help pay for the health care of those at lower levels of income
and wealth.

